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1. INTRODUCTION  
Disasters and the human suffering that follows is on the increase.1  Between 2005 and 2015, 
nearly 800,000 deaths were attributed to disasters.2  According to the UN, 134,000,000 people 
needed humanitarian assistance in 2018 alone.3  Certain states are identified as particularly 
prone to disasters but the catastrophic effects are often international.  The paradigmatic case of 
transboundary harm is the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which killed and affected people in 
twelve states.4  Even where disasters do not transcend territorial boundaries, domestic response 
capacities are often overwhelmed, necessitating international assistance.5 Although external 
states provide humanitarian relief, in practice, the majority of state aid is channelled through 
UN agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).6   
 
Notwithstanding their catastrophic impact and the highly internationalised nature of meeting 
the resulting challenges, disasters have eluded international law’s firm grasp.7  Indeed, the 
IFRC described disasters as a ‘long neglected facet’ and contrasted this with the extensive body 
of international humanitarian law, applicable in times of armed conflict.8  This has remained 
the case despite the UN General Assembly-sponsored International Decade for Natural Disaster 
Risk Reduction in the 1990s and the emergence of international disaster law (IDL) as a distinct 
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1This article makes no distinction between natural and human-made disasters. Greg Bankoff, ‘No Such Things as 
“Natural Disasters”: Why We Had to Invent Them’, Harvard International Review(24 August 2010), K.Chmutina 
et al.,‘Why natural disasters aren’t all that natural’ https://www.opendemocracy.net/ksenia-chmutina-jason-von-
meding-jc-gaillard-lee-bosher/why-natural-disasters-arent-all-that-natural accessed 23 May 2019 
2IFRC, World Disasters Report 2016, Resilience – Saving Lives Today, 233-234, 
http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Documents/Secretariat/201610/WDR%202016-FINAL_web.pdf accessed 23 May 
2019 
3 UNOCHA Gobal Humanitarian Overview, IFRC World Disasters Report (2018) Leaving No One Behind 
https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/world-disaster-report-2018/ accessed 23 May 2019. 
4 ILC, Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters Memorandum by the Secretariat, UN Doc A/CN.4/590, p.12 
5 Ibid, p.147.  
6 David Fisher, ‘The Future of International Disaster Response Law’, (2012) 55 German Yearbook of International 
Law, 87, 92.  Similar trends pervade private funds. 
7 David P. Fidler, ‘Disaster Relief and Governance after the Indian Ocean Tsunami – What Role for International 
Law?’ (2005) 6 Melbourne Journal of International Law, 458, 459 
8 IFRC, World Disasters Report 2000, Focus on Public Health, 147-149 available at 
http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/disasters/WDR/9000-WDR2000.pdf accessed 23 May 2019 
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legal specialism.9  More specifically International Disaster Response Law (IDRL) forms part 
IDL’s corpus, perhaps even occupying a distinct domain.10  Notwithstanding its profile, 
IDL/IDRL remained an unsystematised, patchwork of law.11  Its haphazard development12 may 
be explained by ad hoc, reactive approaches from various actors in a decentralised system, 
employing hard and soft law sources.13  The need for systematization was clear and in 2007 
the ILC included the topic of the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters in its 
programme of work.14  A set of 18 draft Articles were adopted in 201615 with recommendations 
for the elaboration of a treaty.16   
 
Although two international agreements focus specifically on disaster relief,17 numerous 
multilateral agreements and bilateral agreements make significant contributions.18  A large 
number of memoranda of understanding and headquarters agreements (typically entered into 
between IGOs and NGOs and states) are also relevant.19  As noted, significant amounts of soft 
law,20 including resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly,21 U.N. Economic and Social 
Council, and the International Red Cross Red Crescent Movement (hereinafter the RCRC 
Movement) also feature.  There are also political declarations; codes of conduct; operational 
guidelines; and internal U.N. rules and regulations.22  NGOs in particular have made distinctive 
contributions in the disaster field.  As well as driving good practice and awareness of field 
realities, recent decades have seen greater prominence for their law-making efforts.23  Hugely 
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17 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, 1998 Tampere 
Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations. 
18 Valencia Ospina, Prelim. Rep. (n.14) paras 33–35, 37. 
19 A/61/10 (n.12) para. 14 
20Dug Cubie, ‘An Analysis of Soft Law Applicable to Humanitarian Assistance: Relative Normativity in Action?’, 
2 JIHLS (2011) 177 
21 Notably UNGA Res 46/182 (19 December 1991) ‘UN Doc A/RES/46/182. 
22 A/61/10 (n.12) paras.12–15. 
23 Michael Reisman, ‘From the Law of Nations to Transnational Law: Why We Need a New Basic Course for the 
International Curriculum’ (2003-20040 22 Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 397, 403-404 
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influential IDL instruments (discussed in detail in section 3) have included the Sphere 
Handbook24 and the Code of Conduct  for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief.25  Of even greater 
importance are the 2007 IFRC IDRL Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation 
of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance26 which were particularly 
influential on the ILC drafting project.  As well as revealing the scale of the task facing the ILC 
in its codifying project, the foregoing analysis also highlights the ILC’s task of addressing the 
peculiarly conspicuous role of NGOs in this field and the potential legal consequences of their 
prominence. 
 
The draft Articles acknowledged NGOs’ central contribution both in the field and in relevant 
rule-formation and indeed draft Article 3’s commentary drew much from the Red Cross Code 
of Conduct.27  Arguably, therefore, the ILC’s draft Articles recognise and fortify this  important 
role of NGOs.  As well as interfacing with NGOs in the consultation and drafting process 
(although, as noted subsequently, beyond the RCRC Movement, this was rather limited) the 
draft Articles clearly note NGOs’ importance by often articulating their roles in the same 
provisions where recognition is given to the functions of states and the UN.  Indeed, during the 
drafting processes some states were concerned that NGOs were being accorded recognition 
beyond what was acceptable or wise.   
 
This article analyses the role of NGOs in the development and drafting of disaster law in 
general, and the ILC draft Articles in particular, and by extension what this reveals regarding 
NGO subjectivity in international law.  The substantive content of the draft Articles and their 
commentaries and how they pertain to NGOs from an operational perspective, is a further area 
of analysis.  The article initially frames humanitarian NGO subjectivity and how this 
constituency has evolved and how that has implications for its realm of action.  Secondly, given 
its underpinning importance to the ILC project, an analysis of NGO disaster law activity (both 
autonomous and institutional) is analysed via key instruments.  NGOs are a complex and 
diverse community and attempts to address them in some standardised fashion (which was also 
                                                          
24 The Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (revised in 2011) 
http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/95530/The-Sphere-Project-Handbook-20111.pdf accessed 23 May 2019. 
25 https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-1067.pdf accessed 23 May 2019. 
26 https://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/41203/1205600-IDRL%20Guidelines-EN-LR%20(2).pdf accessed 23 May 
2019. 
27 Draft Article 3 Commentary, para. 6. 
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acceptable to states) was always going to challenge the ILC.  These complexities are analysed 
in the final main substantive section of the article with particular attention being given to draft 
Article 12 and the issue of external assistance to disaster-affected states.   
 
2. NGOS AS SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Globalisation’s advent, with its attendant phenomena of state interdependence and global IGO 
governance, has generated persistent questioning of statehood’s pre-eminence.  However, 
while globalisation might explain the causes and factual reality of NGO interventions, 
questions remain open regarding the extent of NGOs’ legal personality.  In terms of law-
making, a related but distinct issue concerns the potential challenge NGOs represent to the 
positivist Westphalian orthodoxy28 (and its attendant shibboleth of inherent state sovereign 
will29) and core notions of legitimacy.30. While NGOs’ direct impact on rule-formation can be 
denounced as illegitimate due to the absence of traditional authorising mandates,31 NGOs have 
nevertheless significantly developed IDL.  This section discusses issues regarding NGO 
personality and provides context for the subsequent analysis of NGOs’ development of IDL 
norms and standards. 
 
NGOs are often more easily defined by what they are not.32  They are often counter-posed to 
international organisations composed of sovereign states,33 those established by governments 
or by intergovernmental agreement,34 and those funded publicly.35  There is no essential 
structural organisation to NGOs, with some operating solely in a single state and others 
operating internationally and transnationally.  Despite presumptions as to their left-leaning 
bias, NGOs represent a considerable diversity of views and interest groups.36  Nevertheless, 
they are classically perceived as acting in the common interest.37   
 
                                                          
28 Steve Charnovitz ‘Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law’, 100 (2006) American Journal of 
International Law 348, 360. 
29 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (CUP 2005) 167. 
30 RüdigerWolfrum, International Law (MPEPIL 2006) 83.  
31 Ibid 88. 
32 Alan Boyle & Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP 2007) 41. 
33 Dwight W. Morrow, The Society of Free States (Harper 1919), in Charnovitz (n.28)351. 
34 rather than by private initiative, ibid, 350. 
35 Boyle & Chinkin (n.32) 53. 
36 See the National Rifle Association, Boyle & Chinkin (n.32), 210. 
37 ‘Non-State Actors and their Influence on International Law’ (1998) 92 ASIL Proceedings, 381, Remarks by 
Diane Otto. 
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The mainstream definition of international law subjects is that such entities are capable of 
exercising rights, making claims and bearing duties in international law.38  Although there 
continue to be detractors,39 the hitherto dominant hyper-Westphalian, state-centric system has 
been displaced. ‘New actors’ which emerged in the late-20th century now claim the benefits of 
international legal personality.40  Nevertheless, as the ILC drafting debates evidence, 
controversies endure as to the extent (or limits) of NGO personality.  On one reading, if 
participation is subjecthood’s key defining quality41 then NGOs’ personality seems undeniable.  
However, visibility and profile do not equal meaningful partnership.  NGOs might draft key 
IDL instruments but, as Mexico articulated in the UNGA Sixth Committee deliberations on 
draft Article 12, if there was a right to offer assistance, only subjects of international law could 
exercise that right.42  The clear implication was that NGOs lacked genuine subjecthood.  In his 
redrafting of draft Article 12 (which, as will be seen in section 4, removed any notions of rights 
and distinguished between categories of assisting actors) the ILC Special Rapporteur Eduardo 
Valencia Ospina tactfully acknowledged such concerns but delicately sidestepped the issue of 
the extent of NGO personality. 
 
The draft Articles also seemingly draw an early bright-line by stressing that the ILC’s primary 
focus is not NGO regulation.  Draft Article 1’s commentaries stress that the project centres on 
the activities of states, IGOs and other entities enjoying specific international legal competence 
in the disaster relief context.  Activities of NGOs and other ‘civil society’ actors are included 
only in a secondary manner either as direct beneficiaries of state duties (such as the state duty 
to cooperate) or indirectly via domestic laws implementing the draft Articles.43  However, 
despite this attempt at delineation, explicit and implicit references to NGO influence 
throughout the draft Articles highlight the complicated relationship between states, NGOs and 
international law with which the ILC had to grapple.  As will be seen in the next section, 
fluctuations in general humanitarian mandates, and variations in individual NGOs’ social and 
political capital further complicated attempts to analyse and systematize their legal identity. 
 
                                                          
38 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (OUP 2012) Chapter 4.  
39 Colin Warbrick ‘States and Recognition in International Law’ in Malcolm Evans (ed.), International Law (OUP 
2006) 217. 
40 Reparation for Injuries (Advisory Opinion) 1949 [178] Robert McCorquodale, The Individual in International 
Law’ in Malcolm Evans (ed.) International Law (OUP 2018) 259. 
41 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process (OUP 1994) 49 
42 UN Doc A/C.6/66/SR.22, para.20. 
43 Draft Article 1 Commentary, para. 3. 
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2.2 Fluctuating Humanitarianism: Impartiality and Human Rights-Based Solidarity 
Until the early 1990s, the RCRC Movement’s monopoly on defining and elaborating the 
standards applicable to humanitarian aid missions meant that the principles of humanity, 
impartiality, neutrality and universality dominated. 44  Theoretically, these removed NGO 
activity from political context45 and were considered to be particularly enabling during the Cold 
War.46  This ethos endures,47 as reflected in ILC draft Article 6, where the aforementioned 
principles still operate as central reference points.   
 
Over time, however, the humanitarian movement broadened its field of activities, progressing 
from the provision of immediate relief, to strategies reflecting long-term solidarity and 
developmemt and advocacy on behalf of victims.  Faced with difficult questions of strategic 
choice and prioritisation, NGOs defended their selection via the language of ethics and 
morals.48  However, this retreat entailed decisions about rightness and just causes, the deserving 
and undeserving, which made explicit the politicisation of the humanitarian endeavour.49  This 
re-routing of NGO objectives accompanied changes in their roles in the global order.  The 
Biafran Famine of 1968 and the perceived failures of the humanitarian system relating to the 
1994 Rwandan genocide are commonly cited as watershed moments50 and need no rehearsal 
here.  However, it is worth noting that the twin principles of ‘freedom of criticism’ (permitting 
NGO denunciation of parties to a conflict) and ‘subsidiarity of sovereignty’, (also called the 
‘right to intervention’) signalled turns from the dominant orthodoxy of needs-based 
humanitarianism.  Inevitably, the application of such judgments raised anxieties as to how the 
common interest could be separated from self-interest’.51  Shaped by the eye of the beholder 
and culturally situated, there is no single vision of the ‘common interest’.  The concept’s 
susceptibility to appropriation by elite interests52 inevitably sparked concerns about the the 
                                                          
44David G. Chandler, ‘The Road to Military Humanitarianism – How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a New 
Humanitarian Agenda’ (2001) 23(2) Human Rights Quarterly, 678, 679, 682. 
45Daniel Warner, ‘The Politics of the Political/Humanitarian Divide’, (1999) 81 International Review of the Red 
Cross 109.  
46Chandler (n.44) 681. 
47Amnesty International, ‘Our Story – Defending our Human Rights for Over 50 Years’ 
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/about-amnesty-international-human-rights accessed 23 May 2019 
48Chandler (n.44) 683. 
49Nicholas Leader, ‘Proliferating Principles – or How to Sup with the Devil without Getting Eaten (1998) 22 
Disasters, 295. 
50Alex De Waal, Famine Crimes 72-77 (Currey 1997).  See Bernard Kouchner’s statement, as quoted in Jonathan 
Benthall, Disasters, Relief and the Media, (Kingston 1993) 125.  Rwanda in particular highlighted the softness of 
certain legal instruments. 
51 Otto (n.37) 381-382 
52 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law: Between Tradition and Renewal’, (2005) 16 European Journal of 
International Law 113, 116 
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assumed moral rectitude of NGOs which were operating in highly politicised environments.  
Humanitarianism gave no guarantees of NGOs’ insulation from the same self-interest, political 
calculations and partial representation of which states were often accused, but about which 
NGOs were infinitely less transparent or accountable.  This anxiety almost certainly 
underpinned the ILC debates as critique of NGOs built across the political and social 
spectrum.53  A further layer of complexity arises from the quite different standing of individual 
NGOs, which is now discussed.  
 
2.3 NGO Diversity – Insiders or Outsiders 
Although NGOs’ profile has rocketed, they occupy very different places within the 
international order,54 depending on their position as ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’.55  The contrasting 
cases of the RCRC Movement and small social change activists illustrate this divergence.   
 
The RCRC Movement consists of three autonomous components with their own legal status: 
The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the National Societies.56  As a collection 
of private associations formed under Swiss law, the RCRC Movement does not fit the criteria 
of an IGO, and so, the ICRC and IFRC are therefore most commonly referred to as NGOs57 
despite this characterisation inadequately capturing their international legal status.  For 
example, both the ICRC and the IFRC have bilateral status agreements with almost 60 
countries, granting them certain privileges and immunities which parallel those enjoyed by 
IGOs.58  Although the case of the IFRC/ICRC is unique, they represent paradigmatic ‘insiders’.   
 
                                                          
53 Kim D. Reimann, ‘Up to No Good? Recent Critics and Critiques of NGOs’, in Henry F. Carey, Subcontracting 
Peace: The Challenges of NGO Peacebuilding (Routledge 2005) 
James McGann and Mary Johnstone ‘The Power Shift and the NGO Credibility Crisis’ 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/176/31423.html, accessed 23 May 2019. 
Nidhi Srinivas, ‘Against NGOs: A Critical Perspective on Nongovernmental Action’ (2009) 38(4) Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly 614 
54 Christian Walter, Subjects of International Law (MPEPIL 2007) 21, McCorquodale, (n.84). 
55 Otto (n.37) 382. 
56 http://www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/the-movement/ accessed 23 May 2019 
57 See for example, Chandler (n.44), Boyle & Chinkin (n.32) 42 
58 Els Debuf, ‘Tools to Do the Job: The ICRC’s Legal Status, Privileges and Immunities’ International Review of 
the Red Cross ’ 97 (2016) 319; Elise Baudot Quéguiner, ‘The Laws and Principles Governing Preparedness Relief 
and Rehabilitation Operations: the unique case of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies’ in International Disaster Response Laws, Principles and Practice – Reflections, Prospects and 
Challenges, (IFRC 2003) 
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In terms of broad, institutional participation, the ‘Arria-formula’ enables NGO representatives 
to informally meet with UN Security Council.59  Similarly, Article 71 of the UN Charter, 
provides for ECOSOC consultation with NGOs.60  This allows NGOs with consultative status 
to attend various types of UN meetings as observers, including law-making diplomatic 
conferences.61  The legal recognition afforded by the UN Charter affords NGOs a unique 
standing among civil society actors, and indicates the indispensable value of NGO-status 
regarding access to the UN system.62  Resolution 1996/3163 embodies the ‘NGO statute’64 and 
establishes criteria for obtaining consultative status.65  Initially, such criteria apparently 
promoted wider participation beyond major international NGOs to grassroots and Global South 
NGOs.66  However, closer examination reveals that non-mainstream and developing countries’ 
NGOs remain disadvantaged in gaining accreditation.67  For example, NGOs need a 
sophisticated and professional organisational structure68 which may challenge bodies with 
small memberships or limited funds.  Three different categories of status can be accorded.  
NGOs with general consultative status (the most extensive) may, for example, submit written 
statements of up to 2000 words, request that items be placed on the ECOSOC’s agenda, and 
designate representatives to sit as observers at public meetings of the commissions and other 
subsidiary organs of ECOSOC.  To acquire such status, however, NGOs must inter alia be 
‘broadly representative of major segments of society in a large number of countries in different 
regions of the word’, which hardly guarantees equality of access.  Mertus analyses the 
inevitable divisions in her taxonomy of civil society, in which she distinguishes ‘kitchen 
tablers’ (local social change activists) from global NGOs which can access international fora 
or indeed organise their own international events.69  This demarcation within civil society 
reveals ‘outsiders’ lacking the access which ‘insiders’ enjoy to the spaces where international 
norms are actually developed.  Further, when ‘outsiders’ do find the opportunity to speak, they 
                                                          
59UN Security Council Working Method, ‘Arria-Formula Meetings’ http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-
security-council-working-methods/arria-formula-meetings.php accessed 23 May 2019 
60 UN Charter Art. 70. 
61 Boyle & Chinkin (n.32) 54 
62 Ibid, 45. 
63 This replaced Resolution 1296 and implemented ECOSOC’s mandate. 
64 Barbara K.Woodward, ‘The Role of International NGOs–An Introduction’, (2011) 19 Willamette Journal of 
International Law & Dispute Resolution 203, 207 
65 ‘Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations’ UN Doc. 
E/RES/1996/31 paras.1-17, 22-30 
66 Ibid, paras.4-6 
67 Julie Mertus, ‘Considering Nonstate Actors in the New Millennium – Toward Expanded Participation in Norm 
Generation and Norm Application’, 32 (2000) New York .University Journal of International Law & Policy, 537, 
562 
68 E/RES 1996/31 (n.116) ¶10-12 
69 Mertus (n.67) 542  
9 
 
are arguably not heard in meaningful ways.70  This is illustrated in the later discussion in section 
3 regarding the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. 
 
In the ILC Consultation process on the draft Articles, it was notable that of the non-state, non-
IGO bodies which participated, none were grassroots organisations.  Indeed, only the RCRC 
Movement, the ultimate insiders, received invitations to comment and understandably took full 
advantage of this opportunity.  Despite the draft Articles’ textual attempts to more explicitly 
recognise the NGO role, their drafting process actually perpetuated shortcomings in NGO 
participation in institutional law-making (further examined in section 3). 
 
3. THE ROLE OF NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL DISASTER LAW  
 
Diverse NGO roles reflect the heterogeneity of the actors themselves,71 with activities being 
broadly divided into the law-making, administration, and enforcement.72  Law-making is this 
article’s focus and so analysis will be divided into two main sections: one concerning 
autonomous NGO activity and another focussing on NGO activity within the institutional 
sphere, with case studies of both.  Given its inherently state-centric nature,73 NGO participation 
in law creation is potentially transformative in terms of the process.74  Although Article 38 of 
the International Court of Justice’s Statute makes no specific mention of NGOs,75 in reality, 
they are involved in all contemporary international law-making mechanisms.  
 
International law can be analysed along two axes; process and enforceability. Process involves  
institutionalised and non-institutionalised processes with the result being categorised as ‘hard’ 
or ‘soft’ law.76  A legal instrument’s enforceability derives from its developmental process 
since traditionally state consent is necessary to produce a binding, hard instrument.  Soft law 
includes non-binding instruments, such as international declarations, recommendations or 
resolutions concluded by IGOs and other non-State actors.77  While not binding per se, soft law 
can transform its nature through later treaty inclusion or via the crystallisation of customary 
                                                          
70 Ibid 546. 
71 ASIL Proceedings (n.37) Remarks by Christine Chinkin, 380. 
72 Woodward (n.108) 212. 
73 Jan Klabbers, International Law (CUP 2018) 24-25. 
74 ASIL Proceedings (n.37) Chinkin, 380. 
75 See Article 38(1)(d) - subsidiary source of the ‘teachings of the most highly qualified publicists’. 
76 Woodward (n.108) 21, Dinah Shelton “International Law and ‘Relative Normativity’” in Malcolm Evans (ed.) 
International Law (ed.) (OUP 2014) 137. 
77 Ibid. Alan Boyle ‘Soft Law International Law-Making’ in Evans (n.40) 119. 
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law (involving generations of state practice usage and intonations).78  NGOs in particular 
demonstrate their autonomous law-making ability by drafting guidelines, codes of conduct, 
expert papers and research.  As soft law, such instruments depend for their authority on the 
prestige of both authors and organisations concerned.79  Epistemic communities, such as the 
International Law Association, command a high degree of authority via the standing of their 
members.80  One noteworthy example is the 2003 Institut de Droit International’s (IDI) Bruges 
resolution on humanitarian assistance.81  A hugely significant IDL document in itself, it also 
impacted the ILC draft Articles considerably.  The Special Rapporteur makes reference to the 
resolution several times, most importantly in relation to draft Article 11 regarding an affected 
state’s duty to seek assistance, the formulation of which derives specifically from Article III, 
paragraph 3 of the Bruges resolution.82  More generally, where there is a legal vacuum, 
instruments like the Bruges resolution are cited to demonstrate that the way has been paved for 
binding rules.83  NGOs also demonstrate considerable energy and skills in drafting texts which 
form blueprints for later instruments including treaties.84  Indeed, the 2007 IFRC IDRL 
Guidelines mentioned in the introduction, though soft, enjoy exceptional standing in legal and 
humanitarian circles through their expert drafting by a key humanitarian NGO (the IFRC).  
They undoubtedly signposted, and were an acknowledged influence upon, the draft Articles as 
discussed in very shortly.   
 
As independent actors, NGOs can develop influential relations with major institutions.  They 
are often key in the treaty-making process by identifying and promoting areas of legal reform.85  
At international conferences they are peerlessly prepared and effective lobbyists.  NGOs also 
influence informal institutional law-making processes, notably via UN General Assembly 
resolutions which are often extremely impactful.  Of particular note are the Guiding Principles 
on Humanitarian Assistance which were annexed to UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 
                                                          
78 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (FRG v Denmark, FRG v Netherlands) [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3, 43. 
79 Boyle & Chinkin (n.32) 89.  See Richard B. Lillich, ‘Current Developments – The Paris Minimum Standards 
of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency’ (1985) 79 American Journal of International Law 1072. 
80 Ibid, Boyle & Chinkin (n.32) 89. 
81 Institute of International Law, Resolution on Humanitarian Assistance (2 September 2003) Bruges. 
82 Art. 11 Commentary para.5. 
83 See, for example, Thérèse O’Donnell and Craig Allan, ‘A Duty of Solidarity’, in Susan C. Breau & Katja L.H. 
Samuel(eds.) Research Handbook on Disasters and International Law (Elgar 2016) 453, 462 regarding duties to 
offer disaster assistance. 
84 Boyle &Chinkin (n.32) 64 
85 For examples see ICRC and the Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons, ibid 63. 
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(1991), and which were described as ‘foundational’86 and ‘landmark arrangements for putting 
in place a coordinated and effective system for humanitarian emergency assistance’.87 
 
The next section focuses on case studies analysing NGOs’ independent and institutional 
contributions to IDL creation.  The former technique is best illustrated in the IFRC’s Disaster 
Law Programme (DLP).  Although states were involved, NGOs (particularly the IFRC) drove 
and developed the DLP.  The aforementioned Sphere Handbook and the 1994 Red Cross Code 
of Conduct are also examined.  The World Inter-Agency Standing Committee and the 
Conferences on Disaster Risk Reduction illustrate the (perhaps more precarious) role of NGOs 
in institutional initiatives.  The ILC Draft Articles as a product of a UN agency also highlight 
this facet of the NGO law-making role, but given their thematic centrality to this article, this 
influence is focused upon in detail in section 4.  
 
3.1 Autonomous NGO activity in International Disaster Law 
(i)IFRC International Disaster Law Programme and the 2007 IDRL Guidelines 
Bookmiller captures the IFRC’s integral contribution to disaster law by stating that ‘[t]he 
Federation has taken what was an essentially non-existent strand of law two decades ago and 
[has] moved it to the centre of a genuine disaster management discourse’.88  In 2001 a 
resolution of the RCRC Council of Delegates created the IFRC Disaster Law Programme.89  Its 
objectives included advocating for the disaster law’s development and improvement through 
the compilation and publication of existing laws and regulations and the evaluation of their 
effectiveness in practice.  It also sought partnership with national governments to promote 
appropriate laws and regulations.90  The project initially found that despite a plethora of 
instruments, the existing patchwork of rules and systems suffered from significant gaps and 
overlaps.91  Domestic authorities also lacked familiarity with relevant instruments and how 
they empowered governments to address some post-disaster challenges.  Consequently, the 
                                                          
86 Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Techniques in International Law-Making: Extrapolation, Analogy, Form and the 
Emergence of an International Law of Disaster Relief, (2017) 28(4) European Journal of International Law 1097, 
1102. 
87 Ibid 1102 
88 Kirsten N. Bookmiller, ‘Closing “the yawning gap”? International Disaster Response Law at Fifteen’, in Breau, 
& Samuel (n.83) 46, 59 
89 Initially entitled ‘The Disaster Response Law Programme’, ‘response’ was removed in 2012 to reflect the 
project’s evolution 
http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/139513/name%20change%20announcement_FINAL%20LATEST%2002.02.201
2.pdf accessed 23 May 2019 
90 http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/139513/idrl-cod-2001s.pdf accessed 23 May 2019 
91 IFRC, International Disaster Response Laws (IDRL) Project Report 2002-2003 14-17 
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IFRC re-focussed to promote IDRL in particular92 and responded to the International 
Conference of the RCRC Movement’s call for it to develop ‘guidelines for … practical use in 
international disaster response activities’.93  In 2006 and 2007, the IFRC organised a series of 
regional conferences, where over 140 governments, 140 National RCRC Societies, and a 
number of international organisations and NGOs participated in order to provide drafting input 
into the Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster 
Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance.  
 
The final IDRL Guidelines were adopted by states and RCRC actors at the 30th International 
RCRC Conference, and were quickly recognised94 as a landmark in disaster law.  Numerous 
domestic laws and rules have drawn language or inspiration from the IDRL Guidelines, with 
an acknowledged influence upon the laws and practices of 22 states including majorly prone 
disaster territories.95  More than twenty states confirmed their active use of the Guidelines and 
their involvement of relevant stakeholders in dialogue regarding them.96  The Guidelines have 
influenced 21 UNGA resolutions97 and numerous resolutions of other IGOs98 and regional 
organisations.99  As well as driving  development of the IDRL Guidelines, the IFRC engaged 
in follow-up cooperation with states to ensure their acceptance and increased legitimacy.  
Strikingly, this process reveals a reversal of the traditional roles played by states and NGOs in  
international conference law-making.  In this example, the IFRC provided a space for the 
development of international law, while states’ presence bestowed the guidelines with 
legitimacy.  Given their chronological proximity and thematic sympathies, the complementary 
                                                          
92 Bookmiller (n.88) 57-59. 
93 http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/41203/1205600-IDRL%20Guidelines-EN-LR%20(2).pdf ‘Introduction’, 7 
accessed 23 May 2019. 
94 By 2011, seven states had incorporated the guidelines or some aspects of them into domestic law with 22 states 
initiating regulatory reviews in light of them 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 
Geneva (28 November – 1 December 2011) 
http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/41203/IDRL%20progress%20report.pdf, 5 accessed 23 May 2019 
95 https://www.ifrc.org/what-we-do/disaster-law/about-disaster-law/international-disaster-response-laws-rules-
and-principles/idrl-guidelines/new-legislation-adopted-on-idrl/ (accessed 23 May 2019). 
96 Ibid 6. 
97 https://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/research-tools-and-publications/key-resolutions/un-general-
assembly-resolutions-on-the-idrl-guidelines/ (accessed 23 May 2019).  See most recently UN GA Res 72/133 (11 
December 2017) UN Doc A/RES/72/133. 
98 UN ECOSOC Resolution 2014/13 of 14 August 2014 on Strengthening of the coordination of emergency 
humanitarian assistance of the United Nations. 
Resolution of the Customs Co-operation Council on the Role of Customs in Natural Disaster Relief, of June 2011. 
99 Organisation of American States (OAS) Resolution 2750 of 4 June 2012 on Existing Mechanisms for Disaster 
Prevention and Response and Humanitarian Assistance Among the Member States, and the InterAmerican Plan 
of 9 May 2012.  
Forty-third Pacific Islands Forum, Forum Communiqué, of 28-20 August 2012. 
European Union, European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, January 2008. 
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relationship between the IDRL Guidelines and the Draft Articles reveals mutually reinforcing 
and supportive outcomes, and healthy state/NGO partnerships. 
 
(ii)In pursuit of Good Practice: The Sphere Handbook  
The Sphere Project (‘Sphere’) was initiated in 1997 by a group of NGOs and the RCRC 
Movement to improve the quality of humanitarian response for conflict and disaster-affected 
populations.  The Handbook consists of interlinked parts including the Humanitarian Charter, 
Protection Principles, Core Standards and Minimum Standards.  The Charter targets 
humanitarian-response practitioners and provides the ethical and legal context underpinning 
the minimum standards.  States, their related entities, and the private sector are secondary 
addressees.  Sphere identifies as a ‘community of humanitarian response practitioners’ 
governed by representatives of global networks of humanitarian agencies.100  It has no 
membership or accreditation process and the Handbook is entirely voluntary.101  Furthermore, 
the project exists entirely outside of the official law-making framework of states or IGOs.  
Consequently, in the absence of signatories, a compliance mechanism or state consent, the 
Sphere Handbook is clearly soft law.102  Nevertheless, its standards mimic the guidance found 
in treaties, legislation and regulations.  As the most comprehensive set of quality standards for 
disaster response,103 the Handbook is a central reference and, despite criticism, the Sphere 
standards enjoy wide acceptance.104  Indeed the Special Rapporteur cited them with approval 
several times.105  While translating the standards into customary international law would 
certainly be a long process involving adoption by states via state practice and opinio juris, 
Sphere’s terms could ultimately acquire binding force upon states.106   
                                                          
100 http://www.sphereproject.org/about/ accessed 23 May 2019 
101Ibid 
102IFRC, World Disaster Report 2000 (n.8) 153. 
103 Secretariat Memorandum (n.4) para. 196.  
104J.Tong ‘Questionable Accountability: MSF and Sphere’ (2004) 28(2) Disasters 176.  
Koenraad Van Brabant ‘Regaining Perspective: The Debate over Quality Assurance and Accountability’ 
https://odihpn.org/magazine/regaining-perspective-the-debate-over-quality-assurance-and-accountability/ 
accessed 23 May 2019. 
Severine Frison, JamesSmith, Karl Blanchet, ‘Does the Humanitarian Sector Use Evidence-informed Standards? 
A Review of the 2011 Sphere Indicators for Wash, Food Security and Nutrition, and Health Action’, (2018) 
http://currents.plos.org/disasters/index.html%3Fp=38647.html accessed 23 May 2019. 
See in particular Tommasso Natoli ‘Non-state humanitarian actors and human rights in disaster scenarios: 
normative role, standard setting and accountability’, in Flavia Zorzi Giustiniani, Emanuele Sommario, Federico 
Casolari, Giulio Bartolini (eds.) 
Routledge Handbook of Human Rights and Disasters(Routledge 2018) 
105 Valencia Ospina, Prelim Rep. (n.14) para. 39 and Third Report A/CN.4/629 para.88, ‘Eighth Report on the 
Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters’, UN Doc A/CN.4/697 para.290. 
106IFRC World Disaster Report 2000 (n.8) 153, S. Ali, T. Kabau ‘Self-Governance by Humanitarian Non-state 
Actors in Health and Nutrition Relief’ (2014) 16 DePaul J. Health Care L.141, 148, Cubie (n.31) 66-69. 
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(iii)Red Cross Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
and Non-Governmental Organisations in Disaster Relief 
The final case study example of autonomous NGO IDL law-making analysed is the Code of 
Conduct for the International RCRC Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations in 
Disaster Relief.107  Similar to the later Sphere Handbook, it is a voluntary code, ‘enforced by 
the will of the organisation accepting it’.108  Although only open to signature by NGOs, this 
belies both its influence109 and its audience.  Unlike Sphere, the Code is not an exclusively self-
regulatory instrument for NGOs, containing as it does in its Annexes, a number of requests 
directed at disaster-affected governments, donor states and IGOs, regarding the desired 
working environment for entities to provide in order to facilitate and optimise humanitarian 
NGOs’ disaster responses.110 The ILC continually referenced the Code in the Secretariat 
Memorandum on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters,111 and indeed it is 
explicitly referenced in the Commentaries to draft Article 3.   
 
Having analysed a selection of NGOs’ independent contributions to IDL, the analysis now 
turns to institutional contributions. 
 
3.2 Institutional Law-Making: IDL and NGO Participation 
 (i)Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
The IASC is a forum which brings together key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners to 
facilitate inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance112 and acts as the central policy-
making body of the humanitarian community113  ‘Standing invitees’ of the IASC include the 
ICRC, IFRC and three NGO consortia: the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, 
Interaction, and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA).114  The Operational 
                                                          
107https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-1067.pdf  
Resolution 4: Principles and action in international humanitarian assistance and protection 
http://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/I413EN.pdf accessed 23 May 2019 
108Code (n.25) p.1  
109Sivakumaran, (n.86) 1103-1104. 
110Including respecting NGOs’ impartiality, providing rapid access to disaster victims, facilitating the timely flow 
of relief goods and information, providing a coordinated disaster information and planning service and providing 
coordinated disaster information and planning services. 
111Secretariat Memorandum (n.4) pp.11, 73, 75, 78, 83, 110, 122, 129, 133.  
112https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/ accessed 23 May 2019 
113IFRC, World Disaster Report 2015 – Focus on local actors, the key to humanitarian effectiveness http://ifrc-
media.org/interactive/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/1293600-World-Disasters-Report-2015_en.pdf at 71 accessed 
23 May 2019 
114Ibid.  
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Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural Disaster 115 were produced by 
the Office of the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the human rights of internally 
displaced persons, after consultation with IASC Working Group members.  The IASC Working 
Group is composed of the directors of policy or equivalent of the IASC member 
organisations.116 While no record of drafting processes is available to the public, NGO 
participation suggests contributions to the Guidelines’ drafting and final approval.  There has, 
however, been criticism of non-inclusive processes which echo Mertus’ aforementioned 
concerns.  A 2014 external review of IASC concluded that it is ‘generally seen as a “Western 
Club”’ and that Southern NGOs were insufficiently represented within the NGO consortia.117  
Of the IASC’s standing invitees, only the IFRC and ICVA include local NGOs directly among 
their membership, while the other two NGO consortia have members that are networks of local 
NGOs.118  Thus, the policy-making body established to bridge the gap between UN and non-
UN organisations (including NGOs) seems to provide uneven access for North/South and 
global/local NGOs, bearing out common suspicions about meaningful NGO participation.  
 
(ii) The World Conferences on Disaster Risk Reduction: Yokohama, Hyogo, and Sendai 
In 1994, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) held its first UN 
World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction which produced the Yokohama Strategy and 
Plan of Action for a Safer World.  This pioneering initiative was followed by outcome 
documents of the later World Conferences at Hyogo119 and Sendai.120  NGOs attended all 
conferences, with accredited NGOs rising from 36 at Yokohama to 188 at Sendai121 with some 
NGO representatives sitting as panellists, and others organising side events.  Again, this 
encourages assumptions of NGO input and influence on final texts which themselves exert 
considerable influence (the Sendai Framework is extensively referenced in ILC 
Commentaries).122  The Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Risk 
                                                          
115 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IDPersons/OperationalGuidelines_IDP.pdf (revised version) 
accessed 23 May 2019.  
116https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/working-group accessed 23 May 2019. 
117Sara Pantuliano et al., Review of the IASC: Requested by the IASC Principals Steering Group. (IASC 2014) in 
World Disaster Report 2015 (n.114) 71. 
118Ibid.  
119 Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/1037 accessed 23 
May 2019. 
120Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 
https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/43291 accessed 23 May 2019. 
121 https://www.unisdr.org/files/45069_proceedingsthirdunitednationsworldc.pdf accessed 23 May 2019 
122 See the Commentaries to draft Articles 2 (para.3), 6 (para.9), 7 (paras. 3 and 8), 9 (paras.2, 3, 6, 10, 15, 16 and 
18). 
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Reduction (which has been active at local level since 2009123) submitted a report entitled 
‘Reality Check – Impact at the Frontline’.124  Paragraph 19(f) of the outcome Sendai 
Framework reads, ‘...it is necessary to empower local authorities and local communities to 
reduce disaster risk, including through resources, incentives and decision-making 
responsibilities, as appropriate’.  This is considered a strong stance on local actors’ roles in 
disaster reduction via enhanced collaboration among local-level people to disseminate 
information via community-based organisations and NGOs.  This successful inclusion was 
attributed to the ‘Reality Check’ report combined with advocacy from other civil society actors.  
This implies considerable NGO institutional influence and power125 and increasing 
receptiveness towards NGOs (a development from the ‘tepid’ treatment of local actors in the 
Yokohama Strategy).126  However,  assessments of a positive trajectory are not universal.  
Some commentators highlight that the Yokohama Strategy recognised the local actors’ in 
determining appropriate international action participation as being of the ‘utmost 
importance’,127 while the Hyogo Framework referenced the importance of local knowledge 
(albeit framing it as a tool for the development of top-down advisories).128  Sendai instead 
refers to the importance of ‘complementing’ scientific knowledge with local knowledge, 
clearly signalling the secondary role of local actors.129  Thus, Sendai is arguably a retrograde 
step and shifts from valuing community input and local action towards passivity, with 
understandings of such actors as ‘aid recipients’.130  
 
It can thus only be inferred that NGOs might have impacted the World Conference outcome 
documents (with the notable exception of Sendai’s paragraph 19(f)).  The absence of transcripts 
or official records of NGO contributions makes impact difficult to quantify.  The treatment of 
NGOs and local actors in the outcome documents is also ambiguous and further doubts 
equating NGO participation and impact.  Moreover, the majority of the NGOs attending Sendai 
                                                          
123‘Views from the Frontline’ - http://www.gndr.org/programmes/vfl.html accessed 23 May 2019. 
124GNDR, ‘How can we ensure impact at the frontline? An implementation plan for civil society, to ensure the 
post-2015 DRR Framework has an impact at the local level’ (March 2015) 
http://www.gndr.org/images/newsite/PDFs/Reality%20Check%20-%20Impact%20at%20the%20Frontline_EN.
pdf accessed 23 May 2019 
125Ibid.  
126World Disaster Report 2015 (n.114) 75-76. 
127Yokohama Strategy and Plan for Action for a Safer World 1994, 
https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/8241 at 5 accessed 23 May 2019 
128Arielle Tozier de la Poterie, Marie-Ange Baudoin, ‘From Yokohama to Sendai – Approaches to Participation 
in International Disaster Risk Reduction Frameworks’, (2015) 6 International. Journal of Disaster Risk Science 
128, 133. 
129Ibid, 135. 
130Ibid 137. 
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were, again, well-known international NGOs, rather than small locally active organisations.131  
Given that the Sendai Framework significantly contoured ILC draft Article 9 on disaster risk 
reduction and that similar concerns have been expressed regarding that draft Article’s tendency 
towards the passivity of local communities and actors,132 it seems that large, international NGO 
involvement was appropriated and has legitimated an institutional process which may in fact 
have produced little for local communities. 
 
The next section focuses on NGOs and institutional law-making in the specific context of the 
ILC Draft Articles. 
 
4. THE ILC DRAFT ARTICLES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS: 
A STRAIGHTFORWARD RELATIONSHIP? 
4.1 The ILC Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters and 
NGOs 
NGOS were influential on the draft Articles in several ways.  NGOs contributed to the draft 
Articles’ textual development, they lobbied for explicit recognition and as noted, previous 
NGO-drafted instruments provided prototypes for the ILC instrument.  First, as regards the 
Articles’ terms, following their first reading adoption in 2014, the ILC transmitted them to 
Governments, relevant international organisations and components of the RCRC Movement 
for comments and observations (which were duly given with some effect).133  Secondly, as 
noted, the Draft Articles and their commentaries explicitly and implicitly reference the central 
role of non-state ‘assisting actors’ (as defined in draft Article 3(d)134) in providing assistance 
to disaster-affected states.135  Finally, as noted already, a number of the key NGO-developed 
instruments were relied upon by the Special Rapporteur in the drafting process.  Most notable 
among these were the 2007 IFRC/IDRL Guidelines which, as already asserted, provided the 
substantive and textual template for the Draft Articles. 
 
                                                          
131For a list of participants, see ‘Proceedings’ (n 121). 
132 Thérèse O’Donnell ‘Vulnerability and The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Protection 
of Persons in the Event of Disasters’ (forthcoming in International Comparative Law Quarterly July 2019). 
133See e.g. Valencia Ospina, Eighth Report (n.105) paras. 86-94. 
See in particular R. Connolly, E. Flaux and A. Wu, “Working Paper on the ILC Draft Articles on the Protection 
of Persons in the event of Disasters”, Human Rights Centre, Queen’s University Belfast, February 2016 which 
was specifically cited by the Special Rapporteur, Eighth Report (n.105) para.6. 
134 The draft Articles define a non-state assisting actor as ‘a competent intergovernmental organization, or a 
relevant non-governmental organization or entity, providing assistance to an affected State with its consent. 
135 See cross-references to draft Article 7 Commentary, para. 1. 
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The ILC draft Articles invoke the phrase ‘international community’ to describe third states, 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), and NGOs which are empowered to offer 
humanitarian assistance.136  Draft Article 12’s commentaries note the pre-eminent position of 
NGOs in the field of disaster assistance137 and reflect the common position that, provided 
certain conditions are fulfilled, such offers are not unfriendly acts or interferences.138  The ILC 
Special Rapporteur considered non-state actors part of ‘the acquis of the international law of 
disaster response’139 and described the particular role of humanitarian organisations as ‘pivotal’ 
in disaster response.140  While there are always concerns regarding the authenticity of their 
motives,141 accountability142 and dangers regarding ‘open door’ policies,143 NGOs’ central 
position in the disaster context seems assured by the draft Articles.  This reflects various hard 
international law provisions like the 1998 Tampere Convention144 and IHL provisions145 in 
particular, and softer instruments such as the 2004 UNOCHA Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement.146  Indeed the commentary to draft Article 7 (which deals with the duty of 
cooperation) notes that: 
The importance of [the IGO and NGO] role has been recognized for some time. In its 
resolution 46/182, the General Assembly confirmed that: 
“Intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations working impartially and with 
strictly humanitarian motives should continue to make a significant contribution in 
supplementing national efforts.”147 
                                                          
136 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Sixty-sixth Session’  (5 May–6 June 
and 7 July–8 August 2014), UN Doc A/69/10, 129. 
137 Draft Article 12 Commentary, para.5. 
138 San Remo Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance, Principle 5. 
139 Eduardo Valencia Ospina, ‘Fourth Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters’, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/643, para.97.  
140 Ibid para.102.  See also Dug Cubie The International Legal Protection of Persons in Humanitarian Crises (Hart 
2017) 28 
141 Karl Penhaul, Dan Simon and Jill Dougherty ‘U.S. missionaries charged with kidnapping in Haiti’ 
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/02/04/haiti.arrests/ accessed 23 May 2019.  Kate van Doore Earthquake 
orphans: what Nepal can learn from Haiti, https://theconversation.com/earthquake-orphans-what-nepal-can-learn-
from-haiti-41165 accessed 23 May 2019 
142 See IASC ‘Protection and Accountability to Affected Populations in the Humanitarian Programme Cycle’ 
(2016) https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/edg_-aap_protection_guidance_note_2016.pdf 
accessed 23 May 2019 
143 Katrien Beeckman ‘International Response to Non-armed Conflict Disasters: Legal Challenges Encountered 
in Light of the Current Regulatory Framework’, (2006) 25(4) Refugee Survey Quarterly 129, 134–135.  Cf. 
potential safeguards mentioned in 2007 IFRC/IDRL Guidelines, ‘Introduction,’ at 6. 
144 See earlier detail (n.17). 
145 UNOCHA Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Principle 25. 
Geneva Convention IV (1949) Arts. 23, 30, 38, 59–63,); Additional Protocol I (1977) Art. 70(2), Additional 
Protocol II (1977) Art. 18(2).  See also Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Vol. I: Rules (CUP 2005), Rule 55. 
146  See in particular Principle 25. 
147 See annex, para. 5. 
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In its resolution 2008/36 of 25 July 2008, the Economic and Social Council recognized: 
“... the benefits of engagement of and coordination with relevant humanitarian actors to the 
effectiveness of humanitarian response, and encourage[d] the United Nations to continue to 
pursue efforts to strengthen partnerships at the global level with the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement, relevant humanitarian non-governmental organizations and 
other participants of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.”148 
 
In total the draft Articles and Commentaries contain 16 references to NGOs and two references 
to ‘civil society’.  The broad reference to such entities,149 illustrates the ILC’s recognition that 
most assisting actors should be captured.  However, despite some definitional open-endedness, 
the draft Articles’ application is limited to assisting actors which are external to the disaster-
affected state.  Accordingly, neither the activities of domestic NGOs, nor those of domestic 
actors which secure external assistance, are covered.150   Draft Article 3’s commentary also 
stresses the importance of the affected state’s consent to external actors’ activities, thereby 
recognising the sometimes broad range of such activities.151 
 
Draft Article 4 addresses matters of human dignity and mandates that ‘The inherent dignity of 
the human person shall be respected and protected in the event of disasters’.  The ILC 
acknowledged that ostensibly this obligation might only apply to states given that ‘different 
legal approaches exist as to non-State entities owing legal obligations, [to protect human 
dignity] under international law’.  However, the ILC clarified that despite its brevity, the 
obligation extended beyond states to ‘assisting actors capable of acquiring legal obligations 
under international law’.  It also clarified that it recognised the different roles played by the 
diverse array of non-state actors.152   
 
A key motivating factor for the ILC project was assisting actors’ concerns about obstruction or 
non-cooperation they faced from disaster-stricken states.  This imperative for cooperation 
drove draft Article 7 which states: 
                                                          
148 Para. 7. 
149 Partly drawn from the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, 26 July 
2005,Article 1, para. 1. 
150 Draft Article 3 Commentary, para. 21. 
151 Draft Article 3 Commentary, para. 22. 
152 Draft Article 4 Commentary, para. 5. 
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In the application of the present draft articles, States shall, as appropriate, cooperate among 
themselves, with the United Nations, with the components of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement, and with other assisting actors. 
However, the commentaries make clear the varying nature of this obligation depending both 
on the actor and the context in which assistance is sought.  The phrase ‘as appropriate’ qualifies 
the draft Article both in terms of respecting existing specific rules establishing cooperative 
obligations among the relevant actors, and permitting contextual determinations as to when 
cooperation is/is not ‘appropriate’.  It also circumscribes the actors with whom cooperation 
should occur.153  Express advertence is made to the UN and in particular the special mandate 
of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)154 and the single focal 
point of the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator.  Draft Article 7’s reference to ‘other assisting 
actors’ cross-references draft Article 3(d)’s definition.  However, the ILC felt it appropriate to 
single out the components of the RCRC Movement, in recognition of the ‘important role’ it 
plays in international cooperation in the very situations covered by the draft Articles.155  Apart 
from this, the ILC intended other assisting actors to be broadly conceived and the commentaries 
cross-reference Paragraphs 19(b) and (d) of the Sendai Framework, which indicate respectively 
that disaster risk reduction ‘requires that responsibilities be shared by central Governments and 
relevant national authorities, sectors and stakeholders’, and that ‘[it] … requires an all-of-
society engagement and partnership’.156 
 
Draft Article 8 outlines specific forms of cooperation many of which seem particularly 
pertinent in the context of major NGO activity.157  However, as its commentaries articulate, 
these are simply illustrative examples and there is no intention ‘to create additional legal 
obligations for either affected states or other assisting actors to engage in certain activities’.158  
Nevertheless, their appropriateness as assisters for overwhelmed disaster stricken states is also 
clearly implicated in draft Article 11 which concerns the duty of affected states to seek external 
assistance.  Draft Article 12 adopts a modest tone in expressing that external actors ‘may’ offer 
assistance to disaster-affected states.  As the commentaries make clear, NGOs can be well-
                                                          
153 Draft Article 7 Commentary, para. 6. 
154 See A/RES/46/182 (n.17). 
155 Draft Article 7 Commentary, para. 8. This reference also includes the ICRC, see draft Article 18 Commentary, 
para. 8.  
156 Draft Article 7 Commentary, para. 8. 
157 These include humanitarian assistance, coordination of international relief actions and communications, and 
making available relief personnel, equipment and goods, and scientific, medical and technical resources. 
158 Draft Article 8 Commentary, para. 5. 
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placed due to their nature, location and expertise, to provide disaster assistance.159  This reflects 
the milestone General Assembly Resolution 43/131 (1988) which urged states, including 
affected states, to assist and facilitate such organisations’ work.160  This central role is 
reinforced by draft Article 16’s terms which obligate disaster-affected states to take appropriate 
measures ‘to ensure the protection of relief personnel and of equipment and goods present’ in 
their territories (or under their jurisdiction or control) for the purpose of providing external 
assistance’.  However, although the ILC instrument suggests a secure position for NGOs in 
disasters, the drafting debates were more fraught than the final terms suggest, and closer 
analysis  suggests an unwillingness to afford assisting NGOs any greater status than they have 
enjoyed hitherto.   
 
4.2  Draft Article 12 
Given NGOs’ vital humanitarian role in disasters the following analysis will focus on draft 
Article 12 and external assistance to affected states.  The final version of the draft Article states: 
1. In the event of disasters, States, the United Nations, and other potential assisting actors 
may offer assistance to the affected State.  
2. When external assistance is sought by an affected State by means of a request addressed 
to another State, the United Nations, or other potential assisting actor, the addressee shall 
expeditiously give due consideration to the request and inform the affected State of its reply. 
This declares the legitimate interest of the international community, states, and organisations 
when disaster strikes.161  However, the simplicity of the draft Article’s terms conceals its 
complex drafting history and its various versions bear analysis for highlighting the ebb and 
flow in perceptions regarding NGOs’ position in disasters and in general international law.  The 
original version of the draft Article proposed in the Special Rapporteur’s Fourth Report in 2011 
stated: 
In responding to disasters, States, the United Nations, other competent intergovernmental 
organizations and relevant non-governmental organizations shall have the right to offer 
assistance to the affected State.162   
                                                          
159 Draft Article 12 Commentary, para. 5. 
160 ‘in particular [regarding] the supply of food, medicines and health care, for which access to victims is essential’.  
See also for example the ASEAN Agreement (n.44) Article 4 and the 2011 South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation Agreement on Rapid Response to Natural Disasters, 26 May 2011, Article 4. 
161 ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Sixty-third session’ UN Doc A/66/10 
277. 
162 Valencia Ospina, Fourth Report, (n.139) 109.   
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ILC members expressed general support for the provision as a practical manifestation of 
solidarity163 and for highlighting that offers of assistance are generally unproblematic.  
However criticisms did materialise.  Some ILC members objected to the general reference to 
legal ‘rights’, since external offers of assistance from the international community were 
typically extended as part of international cooperation, rather than as an assertion of rights.164  
In the particular case of NGOs, some ILC members were exercised regarding the language of 
‘rights’, by virtue its implication that NGOs enjoyed the same rights as states.165  Some 
suggested a general drafting alteration which articulated that ‘third actors may offer assistance’, 
(thereby providing an authorisation and not a right).166  Still others argued for clearer 
differentiation between assistance emanating from non-affected states and IGOs, and that 
provided by NGOs, and that references to NGOs ‘working with strictly humanitarian motives’ 
should be included.167   
 
Having been discussed by the ILC in plenary, the draft provision was then referred to the 
Drafting Committee of the UN General Assembly’s Sixth Committee where its underlying 
sentiment of solidarity was again well-received.168  The Special Rapporteur re-emphasised that 
the draft provision simply reflected a right to offer, rather than provide, assistance, in 
accordance both with the principle of sovereignty and the affected state’s option of refusal .169  
Again, considerable attention was given to questions of whether or not such a provision was 
actually necessary, whether the language of rights was appropriate and what the relationship 
was between the ‘right to offer’ and the duty to cooperate’.170  However, more pertinent was 
the apprehension regarding non-state actors’ iteration.  In particular, there was no mention of 
any part of the RCRC Movement which led to particular anxieties as to whether it fell within 
its terms. 171  More noticeably, states, the UN, other IGOs and NGOs were all specifically 
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itemised and grouped within the same sentence.  This documentary proximity became 
significant since it was argued that only subjects of international law were entitled to exercise 
the right to offer assistance.172  The draft Articles’ textual form therefore raised questions as to 
whether all of these entities occupied the same juridical footing and possessed identical rights 
and capacities.  Singapore, the Czech Republic and Pakistan all expressed their opposition to 
any unanimity of treatment for these different actors.173  The wording as it stood arguably gave 
the impression of conferring rights directly on NGOs, which were not subjects of international 
law.174  Particular concerns  about potential empowerment of some actors, notably NGOs, were 
articulated by Germany which argued for a reformulation which distinguished more clearly 
between third States and IGOs, on the one hand, and NGOs on the other.  
 
The provision was then redrafted to read as follows,  
In responding to disasters, States, the United Nations, and other competent 
intergovernmental organizations have the right to offer assistance to the affected State. 
Relevant non-governmental organizations may also offer assistance to the affected State.175   
As is evident, states, the UN, IGOs and NGOs are all specifically mentioned, with the role of 
NGOs and their capacity to make offers of assistance explicitly recognised.176  However, the 
first three categories of assisting actors are grouped together in one sentence with ‘rights’ to 
offer assistance.  By contrast, mention of NGOs are separated into a second sentence and 
expression changed to reflect that they ‘might’ offer assistance.177  This version’s commentary 
maintained that, while emphasising that states, the UN and IGOs were not only entitled, but 
encouraged, to make offers of assistance, NGOs had a different nature and legal status, and 
were therefore not in possession of the same rights, or subject to the same legal obligations as 
the other actors.178  This clearly sought to allay the previously mentioned concerns regarding 
the endowment of NGOs with rights to which they were not entitled.  Austria expressed 
particular support for this differentiation, and considered that although the second sentence 
acknowledged NGOs’ important disaster role, it should not be understood as bestowing 
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international legal personality upon them.179  The US delegation, however, doubted the 
differentiation’s utility, maintaining that while NGOs clearly had a different nature and legal 
status to states and IGOs, neither affected their capacities to offer assistance to affected states 
indeed, they should be encouraged to do so.180  Its suggestion that the provision be reworded 
to read that states, the UN, IGOs, and NGOs, could offer assistance without any categorical 
distinction ended up being closer in spirit to the final version.181  
 
Non-state actors also made interventions as to this interim version.  In particular, the IFRC was 
concerned that both it and its member national societies were (still) not mentioned.  While it 
accepted that it was technically appropriate for their non-inclusion in the draft article’s iteration 
(since the RCRC Movement make offers of support to national societies of affected states, not 
governments) nevertheless, its wording could lead to confusion as to the Movement’s right to 
act in disasters and it urged that the draft Article’s commentary should clarify that point.182  
Similarly, reference to non-governmental humanitarian agencies only being able to offer their 
services ‘changes —and in a way denies —the right of initiative, to which impartial 
humanitarian organizations such as ICRC are entitled under international humanitarian law and 
which places such organizations in a privileged position’.183  Some NGOs did have rights and 
this should not be obscured.  This point again highlights the considerable heterogeneity of 
NGOs which goes unrecognised by current definitional shortcomings which group together 
powerful global actors like the RCRC Movement and grassroots, local NGOs. 
 
In response, the Special Rapporteur indicated that the differentiation of ‘right/may’ sought to 
stress the different footings of states and IGOs on one hand, and NGOs on the other.  However, 
he acknowledged that such distinctions were false since all actors could assist, regardless of 
the legal grounds on which they base their action.  Any misunderstandings could therefore be 
alleviated by employing the term ‘other assisting actor’184 in place of more specific 
iterations.185  The provision was thus redrafted to read:  
                                                          
179 A/C.6/68/SR.23, para.62 and Valencia Ospina Eighth Report (n.105) paras.306 and 308. 
180 A/C.6/68/SR.23, para.47. 
181 ‘may offer assistance to the affected State, in accordance with international law and applicable domestic laws’. 
182 See Ms. Cooper, (IFRC) A/C.6/66/SR.25.  The EU also wished clarification that such entities were covered 
either by express reference in the draft article or within the commentary, UN Doc A/C.6/66/SR.21. 
183 Valencia Ospina, Eighth Report (n.105) para.312. 
184 Ibid, para.315. 
185 ILC, A/69/10 (n.136) draft Article 4(c), at 95 (stating that, “‘[O]ther assisting actor’ means a competent 
intergovernmental organization, or a relevant non-governmental organization or any other entity or individual 
external to the affected State, providing assistance to that State at its request or with its consent.”).   
25 
 
In responding to disasters, States, the United Nations and other potential assisting actors 
may address an offer of assistance to the affected State.186 
 
In the ILC’s May 2016 meetings, concerns endured about the placing of different actors on the 
same footing187 and indeed one ILC delegate felt uncomfortable with the revised draft of an 
article which ‘had been the result of a hard-won compromise’ and which ‘now had no 
prescriptive meaning’.188  These latter concerns were partly addressed by the addition of a new 
second paragraph.  This outlined the duty of external actors who received requests for 
assistance to expeditiously consider and decide upon them, and introduced a ‘limited duty of 
the actor who might possibly be required to give assistance’.189  According to the Special 
Rapporteur, this wording sought to differentiate between the duty of affected states to seek 
external assistance and the actual making of requests for assistance, which was not a duty.190  
This amendment, along with some textual simplification191 essentially produced the final draft 
Article as outlined at the opening of this section.   
 
In summary, the current standing of the draft Articles, as a collective instrument, is as a set of 
non-binding guidelines.  It was hoped that this (potentially interim) status would allow for 
prompt and wide adoption by relevant actors.192  Nevertheless, if able to demonstrate evidence 
of opinio juris and sufficient state practice, the draft Articles could acquire binding customary 
law status.  Indeed, international tribunals have previously relied upon other ILC Draft 
Articles193 even before their finalisation.  Such developments would confirm the draft Articles 
as the most authoritative IDL instrument.  Given the apprehensions evident in the debates, 
somewhat ironically,  this status would effectively be achieved while completely bypassing 
requirements of state consent.  This development, together with the importance of the RCRC 
Movement in the drafting process, and specific NGO recognition in the final text, potentially 
signals a move away from the traditional state-centred approach towards an increasing NGO 
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role in international law-creation.  Such a conclusion is bolstered given the Special 
Rapporteur’s aforementioned reliance on pre-existing NGO-developed instruments.  However, 
the fact remains that only particular global entities were engaged in the consultation and much 
reliance was placed on existing instruments which had already seen less traditional or powerful 
NGOs ‘eased out’.  This trickled through to palpable unfamiliarity among even large NGOs 
during the draft Articles’ development194 despite nine years of development.  Indeed the 
initiative taken by the Queens University Belfast Human Rights Centre195 seems to have been 
principally due to a particularly vigilant awareness of ILC developments and processes. 
 
The ILC debates  highlighted clear concerns and considerable angst about the standing of 
humanitarian NGOs in international law, and this is the focus of analysis in the next section. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 The Bottom-up Development of International Disaster Law: Closing the Democratic 
Deficit? 
IDL’s bottom-up trajectory196 reveals NGOs assuming responsibilities traditionally attributed 
to states.  Indeed state and IGO regulation followed where NGOs had led.  As frontline actors, 
and with governments preferring to funnel aid through international NGOs,197 it is perhaps 
unsurprising that NGOs have a stake in drafting such instruments.  Generally, however, the 
focus of the NGO autonomously-drafted legal instruments is self-regulation rather than 
managing states’ behaviour.  Such parallel governance sees NGOs mimicking functions 
traditionally attributed to nation states.198  NGOs’ disaster responses (both practical and legal) 
place them in a potentially powerful position.  States’ and IGOs’ reliance on, and guidance by, 
NGO expertise and ground experience is palpable throughout the ILC process and 
documentation.  What might be the likely next step for IDL/IDRL?  Given the considerable 
status of the IFRC/IDRL Guidelines and their national integration (which have certainly 
produced more state practice than the draft Articles) it is unclear if states will eventually rely 
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on the ILC instrument, or whether the Guidelines will endure as the most significant reference 
point.  If the latter, then the NGO influence on IDL/IDRL will be indisputably dominant.  If, 
however, the draft Articles move to the forefront, and particularly if a treaty develops, states’ 
reclamation of some IDL territory they feared lost to NGOs might be witnessed. 
 
These conclusions on non-state-centred law-making would be interesting but less important if 
they represented an isolated example.  However, complex problems wrought by climate change 
and the protection of human rights have also produced significant calls for a reversal of 
traditional law-making approaches.199  Boutros Boutros-Ghali once admitted that sovereignty, 
not democracy, was the international legal system’s guiding principle.200  However, he 
concluded that ‘a fundamental conceptual transformation …[of]… democratization’201  was 
potentially underway.202  This has two aspects.  The first point concerns whether NGO 
participation renders more democratic international law-making.  NGO inclusion might hearten 
those critics who lament international law’s democratic deficit,203 but who nevertheless see a 
more widely participatory system of formalism as potentially retaining value.204  However, 
such perceptions are tested by realities.205  Although NGO-attendance at international IDL law-
making fora is normalised, concrete influence is difficult to quantify.206  Further, where NGOs 
impact law’s development, their participation creates a ‘paradox’ wherein NGOs are active 
‘…in the functioning of international institutions and the implementation of the law created in 
their midst’ even though de jure, they have little (or only a narrowly defined) existence.207  
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While in the immediate term, NGO presence lends considerable legitimacy to outcome 
documents, debilitating suspicions about tokenism and transparency shortfalls can equally 
degrade their currency. 
 
The second aspect to NGOs’ democratising potential208 concerns their representative mandate.  
Characterised as honest humanitarian brokers, they often enjoy perceptions of inherent 
legitimacy as  representatives of global civil society and the ‘muffled masses’.209  However, 
power imbalances between NGOs, domination of NGO offices by wealthier, better-educated 
elites210 and the replication of state power structures cast doubt on their democratising potential 
and abilities to represent marginalised and struggling disaster-stricken communities.211    NGOs 
can advance their agendas by instrumentalising the international system, without being 
answerable to it.212  This both facilitates potentially harmful tunnel vision (which may fail to 
countenance political, economic or social contexts and consequences213) and diminishes 
perceptions of NGOs’ legitimacy.  It is conceded that this may not corrupt final instruments 
given that their validity traditionally remains unquestioned even if some of the participating 
states are not democratically structured.214  However, again, the least desirable aspects of 
Westphalian law-making remain and may even be reinforced by NGO participation. 
 
5.2 The Way Forward? 
Increasing NGO participation and recognition in international law brings opportunities and 
challenges and it must be tackled in the international society we occupy, ‘not from some 
wishful construction of it.’215  As noted, one option is to recognise an enhanced form of legal 
personality for NGOs which, surprisingly, may restrain rather than escalate their power.216  For 
example, while enhanced legal capacities would entail participation rights (and perhaps remove 
notions of NGOs as state-handmaidens)217 it would also oblige NGOs to respect negotiated 
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results and remove their informal, external power.  This might entail letting-go of some 
‘outside’ tools such as campaigns218  Further, although enhanced personality might recognise 
the reality that NGOs effectively already have a ‘seat at the table’,219 it would likely extend 
only to particular organisations.  This would therefore replicate previous problematic 
institutional experiences and actually retrench larger Western NGOs’ privileges.  Recognition 
of all ECOSOC-accredited NGOs (currently standing at 5,161)220 seems unfeasible, but 
revising ECOSOC criteria to be less financially burdensome to NGOs with limited resources 
might enhance equality of access. 221  Clarification of the currently opaque provisions222 for the 
withdrawal of consultative status might also benefit perceptions of enhanced NGO 
accountability.  Such re-thinking would move the debate on from arid discussions as to whether 
NGOs possess personality to focus on recognising their legal reality and the appropriate and 
feasible responses.  
 
The ILC Draft Articles offer an interesting analytical frame for considering the position of 
NGOs in international law.  State discomfort with, but simultaneous reliance upon, NGO field 
and drafting activity came into sharp focus in the ILC project.  Traditional perceptions of NGOs 
as state-antagonists are clearly misplaced (for both positive and negative reasons) as are 
assumptions that NGOs perfectly represent global civil society.  The success of certain NGO-
drafted instruments suggest that NGOs achieve more outside than within institutionalised law-
making structures.  This implies that NGOs have embraced their quasi-legal personality, and 
by reconfiguring it in particular ways, have actually changed law-making processes in a 
particular field.  A ‘golden thread’ might be said to weave from the 1994 Red Cross Code of 
Conduct to the draft Articles.  However, although such instruments often have progressive and 
practically vital qualities, the absence of appropriate regulation, accountability mechanisms 
and transparency mean these are not necessarily unalloyed goods.  Further, the unregulated 
nature of NGOs’ impact on international law stands in direct contrast to positivist legal 
doctrine.  How international law responds to this potential power shift in global governance 
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remains unknown.  In the particular context of the ILC draft Articles, states might choose to 
reclaim territory in a treaty but this seems unlikely in the short term at least.  Thus, the twilight 
world of the General Assembly’s ‘recommended’ usage of the ILC instrument suggests that 
states and international lawyers will continue in a loving, but commitment-phobic relationship, 
both towards the draft Articles and NGOs themselves. 
